A grudging rescue:  France, the Armenians of Cilicia, and the history of humanitarian evacuations by White, Benjamin Thomas
A Grudging Rescue: France, the Armenians of Cilicia, and the 
History of Humanitarian Evacuations 
Benjamin Thomas White
Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism,
and Development, Volume 10, Number 1, Spring 2019, pp. 1-27 (Article)
Published by University of Pennsylvania Press
For additional information about this article
Access provided at 29 Apr 2019 10:04 GMT from University of Glasgow Library
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/722743
Benjamin Thomas White
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History of Humanitarian Evacuations
Humanitarian evacuation is today a well-known practice: within three months of
unrest breaking out in Libya in spring 2011, for example, the International Organi-
zation for Migration oversaw the humanitarian evacuation from the country of some
140,000 “third-country nationals,” mostly migrant workers.1 But it is also a recent
phenomenon. As an articulated policy, humanitarian evacuation only really dates back
to the Kosovo crisis of the 1990s, when Kosovo Albanian refugees were evacuated from
Macedonia. At the time, the United Nations high commissioner for refugees
(UNHCR), Sadako Ogata, described that evacuation as having “no precedent” in her
organization’s history.2
The UNHCR may not have been involved in an evacuation of this kind before
1999, but there are historical precedents. Humanitarian policy documents on contem-
porary evacuations sometimes refer in passing to twentieth-century cases, especially
ones that targeted children: the Vietnam “babylift” of the children of American
servicemen in Vietnam, or the better-known instances of the rescue of Spanish and
Jewish children in the late 1930s.3 In the still quite sparse social science literature on
humanitarian evacuation, meanwhile, the evacuation of Kosovo refugees remains one
of the best-studied cases and is representative of what that literature does and does not
cover. A reasonable body of work covers the evacuees’ experiences after their relo-
cation.4 Their health and wellbeing also rightly receive attention in the medico-social
sciences.5 But the evacuation itself, whether as an episode within a political context,
as a logistical operation, or as an experience lived by the evacuees, is not discussed in
any detail.6
This point holds for research on other cases, in a range of scholarly literature from
international relations to social work: the actual process of evacuation figures as a
blind spot.7 A 2002 study of refugee policy in the new century mentions evacuation
as part of a “policy toolbox” for responding to refugee crises—citing the Kosovo case
as an example—but does not try to explain where this “tool” came from.8 Nor, like
other works, does it give much detail on what actually happened during this or other
evacuations.
This begs a set of related questions. How, why, and when did humanitarian evacu-
ation emerge and develop as a practice? In what broader contexts—and for what
narrower reasons—did particular evacuations occur? What happened during specific
evacuations, and how were they experienced by those who participated in them?
History has a disciplinary contribution to make here: these are historical questions;
though answering them will be useful not only to researchers in other disciplines but
PAGE 1
1
................. 19302$ $CH1 04-03-19 14:41:25 PS
PAGE 2
2 Humanity Spring 2019
also to humanitarian practitioners. As Eleanor Davey argues, for practitioners,
“humanitarian history can strengthen critical analysis by challenging assumptions and
helping to think through complexity.”9 But the rapidly developing field of humani-
tarian history is yet to systematically address humanitarian evacuations and the
complex issues they raise.10
The purpose of this essay is to establish humanitarian evacuations as an object of
historical enquiry. It does so by contextualizing, narrating, and analyzing one specific
case: the evacuation by France of tens of thousands of Armenians from Cilicia, in
what is now Turkey, in the last two weeks of 1921. This case is considerably earlier
than the historical precedents that are usually cited, especially for a general evacuation
rather than one restricted to children. That is significant: it suggests that we must
locate the emergence of the practice in the forced displacements of World War I and
its aftermath. The political logics at work in this period, by which evacuations became
thinkable, were not simply humanitarian. Drawing on archival materials from French
personnel in the region, in France, and internationally, this essay shows how the
decision to evacuate sprang from the interaction of all three contexts, indicating levels
of analysis for understanding other evacuations. By discussing the evacuation as a
logistical operation, this essay emphasizes the complex bureaucratic apparatus that
made it possible—that is, how such an operation became practicable—while also
showing how that apparatus was working at (if not beyond) its limits.
To this end, the focus here is squarely on the evacuation itself. But an important
blind spot remains in the archival record, at least on the French side: very little
material directly documents the evacuees’ own experiences of the operation. And,
indeed, reconstructing what the evacuation meant to them on the basis of the French
archives is impossible. Careful attention to the nature of this archival absence offers
two important insights. First, this evacuation, like others, was triggered by the actions
of the people who would be evacuated. Second, there is a revealing continuity between
the documentary record left by a military-colonial administration in the aftermath of
World War I and that created by humanitarian organizations in the present: a
tendency to exclude the voices of evacuees themselves.
The essay begins by placing the evacuation in the context of the French occupation
of, and withdrawal from, Cilicia: a deeply unsettled context for an evacuation that
was panicked, hasty, and above all unplanned—little more than a week before it
began, the French government was still ruling out any notion of an evacuation. It
next explores the reasons that the French changed their mind, before turning to the
practicalities of the evacuation itself. Finally, it locates the episode in the larger history
of population displacement and draws lessons for understanding the history of
humanitarian evacuations.
* * *
The letterheads of early documents of the French High Commission in the Levant
refer not to “the states of Syria and Lebanon”—the title that would later become
formalized—but to “Syria and Armenia,” and then “Syria and Cilicia.” The changing
title reflects diminishing ambitions. The aspiration to create a larger Armenia under
French sway was short-lived, but in the interval between the Ottoman retreat in late
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1918 and the beginning of coordinated Turkish nationalist action against the terms of
the peace a year later, a French Cilicia briefly became a reality.11
Cilicia, C¸ukurova in modern Turkey, is a region of Anatolia separated from
northern Syria by the Amanus Mountains, and from the rest of Anatolia by the Taurus
range. Watered by the Seyhan River, the area was agriculturally rich.12 It was also of
great strategic value, as a French deputy would stress when he reminded the prime
minister (double-underlining his words for emphasis) that “Cilicia is worth our finest
colonies.”13 In 1916, when Britain, France, and Russia agreed to a plan to partition the
Ottoman Empire in the event of Allied victory—the Sykes-Picot Agreement—inland
Syria, including the cities of Aleppo and Damascus, was merely to be a French “sphere
of influence.” But Cilicia was allocated to the French as a zone of direct occupation,
like the eastern Mediterranean coast from Alexandretta to Tyre.
The area also had a significant Armenian population. It had been the seat of a
medieval Armenian kingdom, and Armenians had continued to inhabit the region
throughout the Ottoman period. In late Ottoman times it had been the object of
Armenian nationalist territorial aspirations, and the scene of large-scale massacres of
Armenians.14 When French forces occupied the area in 1918–1919, they found a popu-
lation whose Armenian element was much reduced by the genocidal deportations of
the war years. Unlike in Syria, where most Ottoman officials had fled with the
retreating army in the last months of the war, they also found a functioning Ottoman
bureaucracy.15 Under French occupation, Cilicia became a destination for large
numbers of Armenian refugees. Genocide survivors returning from deportation in
Syria or Mesopotamia, many of whom hoped to travel on to homes elsewhere, were
repatriated under the auspices of the Service for Repatriation and Assistance for Arme-
nians (Service des rapatriements et de l’assistance pour les Arme´niens).16 Armenians also
arrived from parts of Anatolia outside the French occupation zone, seeking protection
from the continuing violence.
Armenians, though, were only part of the population of a diverse province, and,
even before the genocide, not the largest part.17 Rather like the Greek army that
invaded western Anatolia at the same time, the French army’s push for a militarily
defensible frontier left it overextended and in occupation of a zone whose population
was too large and, for the most part, too hostile for it to maintain order.18 Revenge
attacks against Muslim Turks by Armenians were common; some of the perpetrators
belonged to the French army.19 Turkish nationalist “Societies for the defence of rights”
had existed in the region since the armistice; they were soon involved in armed action.
While the French fought a war against the nationalist army along a front running for
many kilometres through mountainous country, armed insurgents (c¸etes) within the
occupied zone carried out a guerrilla campaign supported from outside by the nation-
alists. This campaign also targeted Armenian civilians.
By 1920, it was apparent to the French leadership in Paris that the war in Cilicia
could not be won: the military task was too great and France’s resources too stretched.
The Turkish nationalist movement had proved itself capable of blocking Allied plans
for Anatolia, and French dirigeants gradually concluded that a peace accord would
better serve French interests: it would permit a rebooting of France’s diplomatic and
commercial relationship with the Ottoman Empire’s successor state, and stabilize the
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situation in Syria. The French parliament had expressed a desire to end the war in
June 1920, and an abortive accord was negotiated in London in March 1921; but it
was not until October that year that a working agreement was reached by the French
envoy Henry Franklin-Bouillon, brokered directly with the nationalist leadership in
Ankara.20 By this time, the Greek advance had been broken, and the nationalists’
negotiating position was much stronger.21 Under the terms of the agreement, French
forces would withdraw over eight weeks in November and December, handing Cilicia
over to Ankara’s representatives in an orderly manner.
The logistics of the withdrawal were complex. As well as redeploying or disbanding
the army of occupation, the French had to negotiate the return of several hundred
prisoners-of-war, releasing hundreds of nationalist prisoners in exchange.22 Local
employees of the occupation authorities, whose position with the new authorities may
have been compromised, had to be paid (up to November 30) and authorized to
depart for Syria.23 The army was also concerned for its dead: the French military
cemetery at Aintab (modern Gaziantep) was vandalized twice in November 1921, a
humiliating symbolic attack on the retreating army about which they could only
protest to the incoming Turkish officials.24 As this case of vandalism suggests, events
on the ground remained unruly, despite the diplomatic agreement: c¸ete attacks
continued against the French, who suspected—plausibly enough—that the nation-
alists were instigating them to keep up the pressure on France, even as they made a
public show of cooperation.25
Then there was the question of materiel. Artillery, encampments, military vehicles,
some seven thousand horses, and “very considerable quantities” of barbed wire all had
to be disposed of.26 Leaving all this to an army the French had just finished
fighting—and might have to fight again—raised many questions. The nationalists
were still fighting a war with Greece, and the Allies had agreed not to provide military
equipment directly to either belligerent.27 In the end, the French ceded some materiel
directly, some indirectly, and withdrew the rest: six hundred tonnes by sea from
Mersin and over five thousand tonnes by rail from Do¨rtyol by November 23.28 The
penultimate issue of their official newspaper, the Courrier d’Adana, advertised a fire-
sale auction of paint, beds, ironware, and other goods belonging to the army.29
Such was the chaotic context of the French withdrawal. I have sketched it in some
detail because, by definition, humanitarian evacuations are influenced by the tense
and fast-changing situations in which they take place. Notable here is the gulf that
had opened, by October 1921, between French military personnel on the ground and
the civilian leadership in Paris and its diplomatic envoy in the region. Officers in
Cilicia had been fighting the Turkish nationalists; to an extent, despite the truce, they
still were. Suspicious of Ankara, and prone to viewing the failure of the occupation as
a failure of political will on the part of their own government, these officers were also
close witnesses to the impact of the 1915 genocide, and more recent attacks and
massacres by nationalist troops and c¸etes on Armenians in Cilicia and beyond. This
did not inevitably make them actively pro-Armenian; they had also experienced serious
difficulties governing an Armenian population that was by no means a docile client.
The French government, meanwhile, needing to consider both the wider diplo-
matic balance of forces and France’s own battered, bankrupt, and war-weary
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condition, was committed to making peace with Ankara. The foreign ministry came
to suspect both Armenian leaders and French officers of deliberately attempting to
sabotage the peace accord; Franklin-Bouillon, in particular, was prickly with suspicion
as he travelled around the region. General Gouraud, the French high commissioner
in Beirut, had the thankless task of communicating unwanted information upward to
his superiors, and unwanted orders downward to his subordinates.
This gulf helps explain the events surrounding the evacuation in several ways. It
surely entered into Armenians’ calculations as they weighed their options and,
ignoring the admonitions of the French government, began to flee Cilicia as soon as
the handover period began. It helps explain why French personnel on the ground did
so little to stop them, despite their orders. Exacerbating the chaotic circumstances of
the withdrawal, it contributed to the pervasive sense of loss of control that charac-
terizes much of the French documentation on this episode, and helps us understand
its paranoid tone. Above all, it explains why French policy went into paralysis in the
face of these events: the French government was already disinclined to trust what its
own men on the ground—and they were all men—were telling it.
* * *
On November 9, 1921, Gouraud issued a proclamation announcing the forth-
coming handover of power in Cilicia. It built up to an appeal to “all good citizens”
not to flee—an appeal that was clearly aimed at some “citizens” in particular, since he
also asserted that “the French government has done what is necessary to safeguard the
rights of minorities.” Leaving, he continued, would be nothing more than a “disas-
trous adventure to which no happy outcome can be seen.”30
But an Armenian exodus from Cilicia was already happening.31 Gouraud certainly
did not believe his own words: he had already warned his superiors that most of
Cilicia’s Armenians would leave with the departing French troops.32 His subordinate
Dufieux, commanding the army of occupation in Cilicia, had been thoroughly disillu-
sioned about the French withdrawal for even longer. Ordered by Gouraud on
November 2 to prevent Armenians from crossing the new border (“without of course
going as far as violence”), Dufieux refused. “I will do the impossible to persuade these
populations to remain in Cilicia,” he wrote, “but I will not employ force to obtain
this result.” Dufieux had clearly stated, months earlier, what guarantees were necessary
for Armenians in Cilicia—guarantees that did not feature in the Ankara Accord. He
announced the accord as ordered, “add[ing] to it the meagre arguments at my disposal
to reassure the populations.” But, partly as a safety valve to prevent popular fears from
spilling over into mass flight or violent unrest, he continued to issue laissez-passer to
Armenians wanting to leave.33
Meanwhile, Gouraud himself continued to tell the ministry that the exodus was
unavoidable; this was the overwhelming impression of his officers on the ground, and
not just Dufieux, who resigned on November 25.34 That day, Gouraud wrote to Paris
that “All the information I receive from Cilicia, and notably that brought back by
Admiral Grandcle´ment, returned from Adana, confirms that, from the beginning, the
Christian population was irrevocably decided to abandon the country before the
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return of the Turks.”35 Some 2,600 had already managed to enter Syria over mountain
tracks by the end of November.36
The French government, then, did not lack evidence of what was happening. By
late November, it was also clear that the measures taken to stop the exodus had only
encouraged it. Every restriction that had been tried—limiting the number of laissez-
passer to one thousand per day, refusing to lay on special trains, limiting the number
of tickets available, refusing further entries into Syria—only spurred more people to
leave, and faster, before options were reduced any further.37 But senior figures in Paris
continued to insist, into early December, that Armenians had no need to leave.
By then, perhaps half the Armenian population of Cilicia had already left, along
with a fairly large number of other people who preferred not to live under rule from
Ankara. Most aimed for parts of the eastern Mediterranean that remained under
foreign control: Palestine, Cyprus, or Egypt, all ruled by Britain; Smyrna, then
occupied by Greece; or Constantinople, under a joint Allied occupation. Almost all
Armenians still in the province were gathered either at the port of Mersin or at
Do¨rtyol, the railway town near the border with the mandate territories.38 Unable to
leave—they lacked the resources of those who had already departed—they simply
waited. Their calm but expectant presence at these gathering-points placed significant
moral pressure on Paris. French personnel on the ground seemed noticeably ready to
transmit this pressure directly to their superiors. Without lobbying openly on the
Armenians’ behalf, neither Gouraud in Beirut nor any of his men in Cilicia appears
to have proposed any action to disperse the assembled refugees.
The incident that broke this impasse did not occur in Cilicia itself, nor in Paris,
but off Alexandria, when the British authorities refused to allow entry to 345 Arme-
nians aboard the Pomone—an elderly, overcrowded freighter that lacked adequate
lifeboats and safety equipment as well as the stipulated amount of airspace for its
passengers. When the refugees aboard were refused entry to Egypt, they took matters
into their own hands and seized control of the ship. Refusing to be returned to Cilicia,
they insisted that they be taken to Lebanon and Syria.39
The resolution of this incident also triggered a resolution to the crisis as a whole.
On December 4, 1921, the foreign ministry instructed Gouraud that the Pomone be
allowed entry to the mandate territories.40 After another few days—around the same
time that the Allied high commissioners at Constantinople declared that that city
would also be closed to refugees from Cilicia—Syria and Lebanon were opened to all
the refugees at Mersin and Do¨rtyol. And by the middle of the month, senior French
officials finally accepted that French responsibility for the refugees extended to evacu-
ating them. Franklin-Bouillon, who had negotiated the agreement with Ankara and
who had repeatedly insisted that the Armenians stay, wrote to the ministry on
December 10 that there was now no choice but to evacuate those who remained.41
This telegram reached Paris via Beirut on December 13; on the same day, Robert de
Caix, secretary-general of the High Commission at Beirut, outlined a plan for the
refugees’ evacuation and resettlement in Syria. The choice was “between organizing
the emigration . . . or washing our hands of the Christians determined to leave the
territories handed back to the Turks, which is morally impossible.” Aristide Briand,
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serving as both foreign minister and prime minister, accepted his plan the following
day.42
What caused this change of mind in Paris, after weeks of paralysis? The discussion
here will focus on three areas. First, regional factors, including the closure of alter-
native destinations and Gouraud’s assessment of risks to the stability of French rule in
the Levant. Second, the constellation of diplomatic and public advocacy on behalf of
the Armenians that constructed French responsibility for them—that made it “morally
impossible,” as de Caix wrote, to abandon them. Third, the pressure created by
refugees’ own actions—again indicated, in a different way, by the Pomone incident.
The first two are easy to read in the French sources, the third less so.
In the eastern Mediterranean, the first weeks of the handover period saw alter-
native destinations close, from Palestine to Constantinople. The mutiny aboard the
Pomone demonstrated that other destinations would refuse entry to refugees from
Cilicia even if they were gathered offshore by the shipload. It also made clear that this
was France’s problem: the British authorities in Egypt refused not only to allow any
more Armenians in, but also to intervene on the Pomone itself.43 It was left to the
French representatives in Alexandria and Cairo, and ultimately the ministry of foreign
affairs itself, to find a solution. They did, by ordering Gouraud to accept the refugees
into Syria.
Viewing matters from Beirut, Gouraud had a clear sense that it was in France’s
interests in the region to accept, and assist, the Armenians of Cilicia. Failing to do so
would undermine France’s credibility as a protector of Christians in Syria and
Lebanon, on whom French rule depended heavily. As he said in one of several forceful
telegrams to the ministry on November 25, the ongoing exodus from the city of Adana
would “serve to discredit us in all the Christian milieux of the Orient, to which we
will be denounced as abandoning our traditional role.” Though he was still preventing
unauthorized ship-borne refugees from landing at Beirut, this message stressed that
repelling refugees by force was unthinkable. Moreover, if refugees were turned back,
they would only join those gathered at Mersin, or “would enter Syria anyway,
exhausted, having passed by convoluted routes.”44 In other words, without a planned
and timely evacuation, the Armenians would run for the Syrian border anyway, and
arrive in a much worse condition. Hasty though it was, the grudging rescue of the
refugees at Mersin and Do¨rtyol meant that they arrived in Syria in fairly good health,
and with a surprising proportion of their material possessions intact. When a similar
number of Anatolian Christian refugees entered Syria on foot in small groups the
following year, after the final defeat of the Greek army, they required much more
basic relief and medical attention.45
The long, frequent, and urgent telegrams that Gouraud was sending to Paris by
late November also clearly communicated that France bore a wider moral responsi-
bility for the fate of the Armenians. Also on November 25, for example, he argued in
favour of allowing an American-run orphanage at Urfa (housing seven hundred
orphans) to be transferred into Syria: “Despite difficulty transport and disadvantage
of installing a new American orphanage in our zone, I believe there would be serious
moral disadvantages to opposing this, and I propose, barring contrary instruction Y.E.
[Your Excellency] to give my authorisation.”46
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Gouraud was not the only person applying moral pressure to the Quai d’Orsay:
his moral argument resonated with a much broader discourse of French moral respon-
sibility for Cilicia’s Armenians. Messages reached the French foreign ministry from an
array of Armenian, French, and foreign actors, by many different routes. The British
government had been receiving messages from Armenian figures, and forwarding them
to the Quai d’Orsay, as far back as April 1921.47 As the handover period began, the
French ambassador in London carefully observed reactions in Britain, suggesting that
Paris stress the protection of ethnic and religious minorities—“one of the ideas that
the average English sentimentality most willingly welcomes”—in Cilicia.48 Ambas-
sadors in Greece and Switzerland similarly monitored the local press.49 The French
minister to Greece also reported his suspicion that “the Armenian colony of Athens,
doubtless at the instigation of certain Greek functionaries, may have telegraphed pres-
ident Harding to warn him that France is leaving the Armenians (of ) Cilicia without
protection and to implore the help of the United States.”50 From Rome, the Holy
See, too, expressed its concern, and its desire to see proper guarantees for the safety of
Cilicia’s Christians.51
Around the time of the Pomone incident, meanwhile, a minor diplomatic spat
occurred when Belgium put the question of Cilicia’s Christians on the agenda for a
meeting of the League of Nations Council in Geneva. This drew sharp words from
Briand. The Belgian foreign minister quickly assured the French ambassador that
Belgium would follow the French line; his government had only taken this step to
avert an intended “declaration to Christendom” by the influential cardinal Mercier.
The Belgian government was also under pressure from local philarmenian groups.52
Armenians in and beyond the eastern Mediterranean articulated their own claims
on France in this context, including requests for assistance in leaving Cilicia. On
November 8, a group of Armenians at Larnaca in Cyprus wrote a telegram of warning:
“Imminent evacuation Cilicia French troops handover to Kemalists presage atrocities
total obliteration Christian populations guarantees vague promises minorities cannot
safeguard lives and goods [of] Armenians who address last desperate appeal and beg
facilitate emigration.”53 Their message reached the ministry via the Armenian National
Delegation in Paris, but the authors were themselves probably recent refugees from
Cilicia. On the same day, Monsignor Nazlian, vicar of the Armenian Catholic patri-
archate in Allied-occupied Constantinople, visited Pelle´, the French ambassador there.
Nazlian made several demands on behalf of Cilician Armenians of all denominations,
insisting particularly on French support for the expatriation of Christians wishing to
leave Cilicia, and for their settlement in Syria.54
External actors of all kinds—from private individuals to foreign governments,
from Armenian groups elsewhere to the Council of the League of Nations, from
French parliamentarians to the Pope—intervened on behalf of the Armenians of
Cilicia. Their interventions ranged from simply expressing concern to making detailed
and specific demands. What mattered more than any individual intervention was how,
in aggregate, they made clear to French leaders that an interested and influential
public, at home and internationally, would pay close attention to whatever happened
during and after the handover—and be ready to hold France responsible. The French
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took such pressure seriously; correspondence on the issue, for example between Paris
and Beirut, was routinely copied to French representatives in multiple other locations
including London, Geneva, Constantinople, Cairo, Athens, Rome, and Washington.
If we wish to understand what might induce a state to carry out a humanitarian
evacuation, then, this instance provides two obvious levels of analysis. On the one
hand, there is old-fashioned realpolitik. Paris had reckoned up France’s balance of
interests and come to terms with Ankara; eventually, it also accepted Gouraud’s
assessment of what the consequences in the Levant would be, and how France must
respond to an incipient humanitarian emergency. On the other hand, there is the
argument of moral responsibility. Here, we can identify the publics among whom
there developed a modern “humanitarian imagination,” in Keith Watenpaugh’s useful
term, with Cilicia’s Armenians as its object. We can see how support for them was
mobilized through media ranging from pamphlets to prayers, and political pressure
applied on their behalf.55 This sense of responsibility, discussed in more detail below,
was part of what made the evacuation thinkable.
More important than both of these, though, was the agency of the refugees them-
selves. The capacity to act is harder to “see” in the archives, for the very image of the
refugee—then as now—operates to conceal it. Refugees typically appear in the
discourse of both states and humanitarian organizations as passive, needy, and helpless,
and the Cilician case shows how this discourse inscribes itself into the archive.56 From
the French sources, we can see how policy was formed in a dialogue among the foreign
ministry in Paris, its mission to the nascent League of Nations, and the High
Commission in Beirut. We can also see evidence that policy decisions were influenced
by pressure from other states as well as certain private groups and individuals in France
and abroad. But the refugees themselves do not feature as interlocutors, even in the
High Commission records; the archives I have consulted contain little material
generated by refugees, and none documenting negotiations between them and the
French.57 The structure of the archive works to create the impression that French
policy toward the refugees was decided among French officials then applied to the
refugees, as submissive objects, by fiat.58
At the same time, though, the contents of the archive provide ample evidence to
suggest that the single most important factor driving French policy was what the
refugees themselves were doing. It is true enough to see this population as charac-
terized by intense human need, but it was neither passive nor helpless. The mutiny
on the Pomone demonstrates as much, as does the departure of over thirty thousand
Armenians from Cilicia by themselves. Almost as many made their way to Mersin and
Do¨rtyol, where their gathering and waiting placed an irresistible moral pressure on
the withdrawing imperial power. Refugees are frightening to states precisely because
they are not helpless, but rather political agents in their own right. French official
sources betray this fear of refugee agency in their shrill insistence that the Armenians
should stay in Cilicia: that is, passively accept the fate decided for them, rather than
take actions that might upset the Franco-Turkish agreement. They show it more
visibly still in their attribution of blame for the exodus to external actors, whether
disloyal French personnel on the ground, shadowy Armenian nationalist committees,
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foreign powers (especially Britain), or even coalitions of the above—like the “Anglo-
Greco-Armenian agents” blamed by French intelligence services in Constantinople for
propelling the exodus.59
This conspiratorial thinking was not entirely groundless: many other actors had a
stake in the postwar settlement in the eastern Mediterranean, and the interests of
Britain, Greece, or Armenian nationalist groups did not necessarily align with those
of France. But blaming the exodus on these external actors—perceiving, as Dzovinar
Ke´vonian puts it, a “vast international plot directed against France”—denied the
obvious.60 Long before the Franklin-Bouillon accord was belatedly publicized in the
region, Armenians in Cilicia recognized that the French military occupation had had
its day and that Paris was looking for a way out. The eight-week handover period
provided adequate time to ensure that they were leaving with at least some of their
belongings. That Armenians in the region would not wish to remain under Turkish
nationalist authority should have been evident, even without the massacres of Arme-
nians that accompanied nationalist advances in Marash and Hadjin (modern-day
Kahramanmaras¸ and Saimbeyli) in 1920–1. Ke´vonian rightly calls the exodus “a fore-
seeable humanitarian catastrophe” that can be understood by “the simple history of
the years of war and occupation.”61 But in the conspiratorial mindset of some French
officials, the fact that virtually all the Armenians in the province had left their homes
was taken as proof that their departure must have been externally planned; the calm
way in which they had departed, even gathering their belongings first, was presented
as conclusive. As the handover period progressed, such thinking mutated into a wide-
spread fear that armed Armenians would seize Do¨rtyol as French troops withdrew and
either establish an Armenian enclave or force the redrawing of the new border to
include the town in Syria.62 Either way, the smooth establishment of diplomatic ties
between France and the new Turkey would be sabotaged. Refugees’ actions would
block the designs of states.
* * *
Despite the paralysis that had delayed it, and the paranoia that accompanied it,
once the decision to evacuate the remaining Armenians from Cilicia was taken it was
executed with impressive speed. The evacuation took little more than two weeks: all
the time that remained before the final French withdrawal. When General Dufieux
announced the Franklin-Bouillon accord in Adana on November 2, he explicitly told
Christian leaders that “No special trains will be provided, no boats will be chartered
by the French authorities for emigrants.”63 But that is exactly how this hurried—but,
given the circumstances, orderly—mass transfer was carried out: by trains, and by
chartered boats.
In mid-December, de Caix estimated the number of refugees gathered at the
Do¨rtyol railhead at seven or eight thousand.64 They were not travelling light. In late
December, a French officer reported that the railway station was “encumbered with
materials of every kind, a real encampment is installed around it, the Armenians are
carrying everything away, bedding, planks, tiles.”65 The head of the joint Franco-
Turkish committee overseeing the withdrawal had earlier received reports indicating
that departing Armenians were “demolishing their houses in order to remove the
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construction timber” and given orders—seemingly unsuccessful—that such
destruction should stop.66 Both men took such preparations as evidence that the
exodus had been planned and coordinated by Armenian nationalist groups acting
against French interests. The foreign ministry later put the total number of refugees
who had arrived overland at about twelve thousand.67
A larger number still was gathered at Mersin, and a much fuller documentary
record of that group’s actual evacuation survives. The High Commission chartered
several large ships from the Compagnie des Messageries maritimes, who operated a
rapid relay to carry some 16,500 Armenians by sea to the Syrian and Lebanese coast.68
These vessels dwarfed the Pomone: the Valetta carried 1,511 refugees on its sailing from
Mersin on the evening of December 18, when the Copenhague was already docked and
expecting to embark 2,500; the Alge´rien and Black Prince were due to arrive in the
following days, with a capacity of 2,500 and 3,000 passengers, respectively.69 These
refugees, too, brought their belongings with them. The French foreign ministry
claimed that the docks at Beirut alone, where 10,500 refugees disembarked, handled
25,000 cubic metres of “packages and bundles of every sort”—nearly 2.5 cubic metres
per person, the equivalent of two very large crates. This baggage, which included
“carpets, blankets, mattresses, etc.,” was given a sanitary inspection, while the refugees
themselves were “automatically showered, deloused, and vaccinated on their arrival”
and their clothes steamed.70
This seaborne operation was far from haphazard. The refugees were assembled
into groups of around fifty, with a number and a nominal head for ease of organi-
zation. A document like a passenger manifest was completed for each of these,
detailing its composition by family group, each listed under the name of its head,
whose occupation was also recorded. So was the number of people in each family,
though quite a few consisted of only one person. The family head was usually a man,
though sometimes a woman, in which case the occupation was often left blank or
recorded as “widow.” There was a “comments” column, mainly used to note the
number of young children in each group (who may not have been included in the
total number of persons). The final group, whose departure was dated December 28,
1921, was larger than most: it numbered ninety-one people, with the handwritten note
“embarked at last moment—expatriated fr [sic] political reasons.” There were a few
anomalous groups: about 350 from Mesopotamia, Assyro-chalde´ens according to anno-
tations in blue pencil, evacuated to Homs via Tripoli in 7 groups of about 50 each;
over 300 orphans and assorted carers from an orphanage run by the Armenian General
Benevolent Union, all named individually.71
These documents are a snapshot of the evacuation in progress. (I have not found
any planning documents.) The picture they allow us to draw offers insights into
humanitarian evacuations more generally. A key point is the development of logistical
techniques and their application for humanitarian purposes. In this instance, the
immediate antecedents would be the techniques of transfer used by the Service des
rapatriements, and their likely origin in the French state’s military transportation tech-
niques of the years 1914–1918. Beyond the French case, while the war and its aftermath
witnessed forced displacement on a gigantic scale, they also saw the development of
practices of nonviolent long-range population transfer, for example in the postwar
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exchanges of prisoners-of-war and interned civilians, which affected hundreds of thou-
sands of people. These, not coincidentally, were coordinated by the future high
commissioner for refugees, Fridtjof Nansen, who was praised not only for the diplo-
matic skill with which he negotiated them, but also for raising the money to cover the
cost from voluntary contributions.72 Such techniques were what made evacuations
practicable.
These techniques cannot be separated from the development of modern bureau-
cratic states, and in fact everything about the surviving archival record remains
fundamentally “state-centric.” It is a striking feature of the evacuation, and the broader
exodus of Armenians, that the refugees never left the encompassing matrix of the
modern state bureaucracy—even though the state authority concerned not only had a
formal policy of encouraging them to stay, but was also in the process of dismantling
itself. Those who quit Cilicia under their own steam during November departed with
their papers in order, bearing laissez-passer issued and duly stamped by French offi-
cials: 39,377 of them, including about four thousand non-Armenians.73 (Not everyone
bearing a laissez-passer had the means to leave in November: there is some overlap
between this figure and the total of those evacuated later.) Those who were evacuated
were bureaucratically managed on a grand scale, as the passenger documents indicate.
Beneath the stamp of the French officer in charge, Lieutenant Gagneux, these include
a list of recipients. Each stamped form that remains in the diplomatic archives at
Nantes—over 260 of them for the main body of refugees at Mersin—once existed in
ten copies, distributed to different civilian and military branches of the French admin-
istrations in Cilicia and Beirut as well as the head of each group, the ship’s captain,
and the Messageries maritimes.
The information recorded on these forms proffers a sense of what mattered to the
French authorities—and, indeed, to any state in the postwar order that was taking
shape under the management of the League of Nations. Listed at the head of each
document, along with a note that “those concerned have been warned that they travel
at their own risk and peril,” was the point of origin of each group and, perhaps more
important, their destination in the mandate territories. “The absorptive capacities of
the different localities or regions of Syria and Lebanon were studied in minute detail
[furent minutieusement e´tudie´es],” reported the foreign ministry, in terms very charac-
teristic of the League. From their arrival points, the refugees were transported to their
final destinations in secondary convoys by sea, rail, or truck. “This system of
dispersal,” the foreign ministry report continued, “besides the facilities it offered from
the point of view of work, also had the advantage of avoiding large concentrations [of
refugees] which might have serious drawbacks from the economic and social point of
view.”74
In the postwar world, massively expanded state intervention in social and
economic life had made “economic viability” a key measure of new states’ fitness for
independence, and economic stewardship was part of the rhetorical justification for
mandatory rule. Knowing the occupations of the evacuees, or the number of
dependent children, would allow the French to manage their integration into the
mandatory economy; orphans were perhaps listed individually because they were more
likely to become an individual responsibility of the mandatory authorities, whereas
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family groups were the responsibility of the head of the family. The financial cost of
the evacuation was also a prominent concern. Beneath the list of families were details
of the payment made to cover the cost of their transportation. Usually the refugees
paid their own way, at sixty francs each. Sometimes the costs were borne by Armenian
organizations or by the French themselves, in which case there is an explanatory note:
“indigent” for the former, for example, or “ex-gendarmes” for the latter.
The very visible regime of medical surveillance of the evacuees noted at Beirut,
which extended to other ports, similarly fits within a history of augmented state inter-
vention in public and private life. In the first instance, medical surveillance was
intended to reassure both the mandatory authorities and the local population that the
refugees would not bring disease with them; there had been some recent cases of
smallpox in Cilicia.75 More largely, it reflects an expanded state concern with disease
control, and a consequent medicalization of migration.
As such wholly “state” sources, the passenger documents afford some analysis of
the refugees as a population, in the sense of the term that Foucault outlines in
“Governmentality”: that is, a statistically knowable object of government.76 But these
materials tell us nothing about how the evacuation was experienced by the evacuees
themselves.
* * *
The foreign ministry’s reports to the League on the refugees’ rapid integration are
bland, upbeat, and brief. They are hard to check against the records of the High
Commission. Quite detailed sources survive for the evacuation itself, but the operation
to receive and disperse them in the mandate territories was carried out by the Service
d’Hygie`ne et d’Assistance publique, one of the most important mandatory agencies,
whose archives are missing.77 But, among the total population of Armenian refugees
in the mandate territories, it is likely that the evacuees were rehabilitated—to use the
terminology of a slightly later period—fairly quickly, and that the aim of limiting
French financial responsibility for them was achieved as abruptly as possible; as we
have seen, in most cases, the refugees even paid the cost of their own transportation,
though at a low fare. One thing about their resettlement in the mandate territories
deserves note, though. Apart from routine political temperature-taking by the French
intelligence services, the populations of Lebanon and Syria do not appear to have been
consulted in any way about the process. This would set a precedent for the 1920s and
’30s, making refugee settlement a politically contentious issue throughout the mandate
period.78
The exodus of Armenians from Cilicia is part of a longer and larger history of
population displacement and state formation in the Middle East and in the world.
Over the last fifteen years or so, historians of Europe have begun to recognize the
importance of this history, especially for understanding the deeply unsettled periods
that followed both world wars, and have adopted the “itinerant perspective” of the
refugee to explore it.79 Other episodes of mass displacement elsewhere in the world,
such as south and east Asia, have generated an increasingly large and sophisticated
body of scholarship.80 The development of the field means that the global history of
refugees is being brought within one analytical frame.81 Historians of the Middle East
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are also beginning to add to that literature, in ways that deepen our understanding of
the region’s past and present while enriching, and also challenging, the emerging
narrative of global refugee history.82
In the case at hand, the flight of Armenians from Cilicia as the modern Turkish
Republic took shape is a clear instance of what Aristide Zolberg calls “the formation
of new states as a refugee-generating process.”83 But it is also an outcome of develop-
ments over the previous half century that turn Zolberg’s formulation around: late
Ottoman state-building was deeply influenced by the arrival of, and need to provide
for, Muslim refugees forced out of the Caucasus or breakaway states in the Balkans.
Modern Turkish nationalism, a “haven nationalism,” owed much to these migra-
tions.84 So did the empire’s increasing suspicion of its remaining Christian populations
and the resulting “population politics” of the late imperial and early Republican
periods, which during World War I went as far as genocidal massacres and deporta-
tions.85 The former Young Turks fighting the French in 1919–1921 had a vision of
Anatolia that had no place for Christians, and the Armenians of Cilicia knew it.
French officers also assumed, at the start of their occupation of Cilicia, that the
region’s near future would involve further mass migrations—but of different people.86
If the preemptive flight of Cilicia’s Armenians has many precedents and parallels
in the region and beyond, the operation to evacuate nearly half of them is different.
Analyzing it suggests ways to address the history of humanitarian evacuations more
generally, in terms of establishing a chronology, understanding specific cases, and
approaching sources. It also raises many questions that warrant exploration.
The evacuation of December 1921 was earlier and less selective than the evacua-
tions of children that are most often mentioned as early examples. Tracking
evacuations chronologically matters, not simply in a descriptive sense, nor in the unil-
luminating search for the “first” instance of a given phenomenon, but because it helps
us understand the context in which the practice of humanitarian evacuation emerged
and the political logics that underpinned it. It suggests that we situate the practice in
the era of mass repatriations of prisoners-of-war, and repatriation and resettlement of
refugees. The episode occurred on the cusp of the emergence of international institu-
tions to manage such mass population transfers: after Fridtjof Nansen began
negotiating prisoner-of-war repatriations on behalf of the new League of Nations, but
before he was appointed high commissioner for refugees or proposed the population
exchange between Greece and Turkey.
As working hypotheses for further research, I would argue that humanitarian evac-
uation on this scale became thinkable because mass population displacement had been
normalized, and became practicable through the development of military logistical
techniques (tested in the mass troop movements of the World War I era) and their
application to humanitarian purposes in the post-war activities of the Service des rapa-
triements.87 We can see material examples of this in the use of Indian Army infantry
tents to house nearly fifty thousand Christian refugees from Anatolia and the Caucasus
in a camp at Baquba near Baghdad run by the British military in 1918–1921, or in the
loan to Nansen of tents left at Salonica by the demobilising French expeditionary
force in Macedonia for housing Asia Minor refugees at the end of the Greek-Turkish
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war.88 How these techniques and the responsibility for employing them were trans-
mitted from national militaries to humanitarian agencies and international
organizations, especially after 1945, remains to be investigated. In any case, its osten-
sibly humanitarian aims should not mask the Cilician evacuation’s uncomfortably
close relationship with wartime and postwar deportations and expulsions. It does not
contradict Keith Watenpaugh’s bleak but well-grounded observation that “humani-
tarian” transfer benefits the powerful and rewards the perpetrators of violence.89
Placing this evacuation in the context of other contemporary state-directed popu-
lation transfers also raises the question of what is specific about humanitarian
evacuation. In place and time, the closest parallel to the Cilician evacuation is probably
the Allied rescue, in 1915, of several thousand Armenians besieged by Ottoman forces
at Musa Dagh, on the gulf of Alexandretta.90 But that was a wartime rescue, and
although they included men, women, and children, the Armenians involved were
engaged in armed resistance against the Ottoman state. They were rescued by bellig-
erents fighting that state; many of the men would later serve in the French armed
forces. Military imperatives, in other words, were at work alongside humanitarian
ones. The same goes for British and French involvement in the evacuation of White
Russian soldiers, accompanied by many civilians, earlier in 1921—which was also
partly a self-evacuation, General Wrangel’s forces in the Crimea being transported on
the ships of the imperial Black Sea fleet.91 The ongoing cost of supporting Russian
refugees in the Straits zone was certainly on French officials’ minds as they argued
that Cilicia’s Armenians should stay where they were.92
Despite a family resemblance to these other evacuations, though, the Cilician case
lacks the immediate military element, and therefore appears more “purely” humani-
tarian. One might be tempted to argue that it represents a distinctive step toward
modern humanitarian practice—but if this is true, it only highlights how often that
practice has remained beholden, if not to immediate military necessity, then certainly
to wider strategic and diplomatic imperatives. The Kosovo evacuation responded to
NATO’s strategic interest in relieving the pressure placed on Macedonia by the arrival
of hundreds of thousands of Kosovo Albanian refugees, and—less concretely but just
as importantly—the alliance’s need to preserve its moral authority internationally.93
All of these examples raise the issue of responsibility. British and French support
for the White side in the Russian Civil War left British and French policymakers with
a sense of responsibility, however grudging, for their defeated allies. In Kosovo, NATO
came under pressure because its bombing campaign had sharply exacerbated the
refugee crisis.94 The Cilician case helps us understand how such responsibility is
constructed by public pressure, mobilized through and brought to bear by specific
organizations, amplified by the media of the time, or channelled through influential
interlocutors like the Belgian cardinal, Mercier. Newspaper articles, books, posters,
homilies, politicians’ speeches, and official reports had all diffused a humanitarian
concern for Ottoman Christians among European and North American publics in
recent decades.95 Now, church-based, philarmenian, and other voluntary organizations
as well as prominent individuals and Armenian diaspora organizations acted to put
pressure on governments and the new League of Nations to intervene on behalf of the
Armenians in Cilicia. The archival traces left by that pressure suggest that it mattered
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to the French, but just how much—relative, say, to a concern for political stability in
the mandate territories—remains moot. Future research on other cases may be able to
judge the weight of responsibility more precisely.
A contemporary comparison also suggests that when states can evade such respon-
sibility, they will. When the Turkish nationalist army entered Smyrna in September
1922, tens of thousands of mostly Greek Orthodox refugees met the violent fate that
Cilicia’s Armenians had feared—an outcome aggravated by the fact that this was a
conquest in the midst of war, not a handover (however chaotic) following a truce.
Whereas the French occupation authorities in Cilicia were withdrawing from an
armed ceasefire, the Greek occupation authorities in Smyrna were fleeing catastrophic
military defeat, their soldiers in almost as desperate a state as the Anatolian Christians
fleeing along-side them. The civilian refugees were much more numerous, while the
capacities of the occupying power were much weaker. As for the foreign powers whose
representatives watched the city burn from ships in the harbour, no single one of them
would be considered responsible for the fate of its inhabitants—so none of them took
responsibility. When it finally began, the evacuation of refugees was almost as rapid
as the evacuation from Cilicia and an order of magnitude larger. But it came too late,
and it started as a private initiative of Asa Jennings, an American working for the
YMCA in Smyrna, who essentially shamed several governments into action.96
Comparing Smyrna and Cilicia suggests that understanding a decision to evacuate
(or not) a population in distress requires an analysis of how “responsibility” for that
population is constructed. Here, again, the question of what happened after 1945,
when it became easier for responsibility to be shifted onto international organizations,
deserves attention. But a sense of responsibility is not enough in itself. As I have
stressed, agency also lay with the Cilician Armenians themselves: all the states
concerned, and especially France, were reacting to their concrete refusal to accept the
part allocated to them in Franklin-Bouillon’s diplomacy. The French foreign ministry
could have ignored any number of letters from the Vatican, but it could not ignore
tens of thousands of Armenians gathered at Mersin and Do¨rtyol, or the hundreds of
mutineers on the Pomone.97
It is the letters from the Vatican, though, that ended up in the French archives.
Reflecting on what those archives contain, and what they do not, offers other lessons
for understanding humanitarian evacuations. First, the prevalence of “state” voices in
the archive suggests that evacuations primarily serve the interests of states, not of the
people being evacuated. Certainly, the marginalization of refugee voices in the archive
indicates that their interests came a distant second to those of the French state. The
archive only implicitly demonstrates that the Armenians were the main drivers of the
decision to evacuate. But the French refusal to listen to refugee voices had its own
effect on the events of late 1921. Ronald Perry, who has worked extensively on evacua-
tions in the aftermath of disasters, makes the point that disaster victims “typically act
rationally, given the limited information they have about the situation. They do not
flee in panic, wander aimlessly in shock or comply docilely with the recommendations
of authorities. Instead, victims are likely to make their own decisions about whether
and when to evacuate.”98 He could be describing the Cilician Armenians facing the
political disaster of the French withdrawal. If French decision-makers had consulted
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the Armenians and planned accordingly, their response might have been less panicked,
suspicious, and belated.
This is a final lesson of the case, not just for historians but also for those involved
in planning evacuations in the present. There is still today a strong, and perhaps hard
to avoid, tendency for agencies working with refugees—governmental, nongovern-
mental, or international—to prioritize their own bureaucratic needs and those of
similar organizations, and to run into problems as a result. For example, the inde-
pendent review of the operations of the United Nations High Commission for
Refugees during the Kosovo crisis, including the humanitarian evacuation
programme, consulted well over 150 bureaucratic offices—of ministries, NGOs, inter-
national organizations—in ten countries. But, notwithstanding a note in the terms of
reference that “During field visits, the views of refugees and former refugees will be
solicited,” there appears to have been no formal mechanism for incorporating and
learning from the experiences of refugees themselves.99 More recently, the Interna-
tional Organization for Migration’s three-month report on its response to the 2011
Libyan crisis includes a section with half a dozen short “personal stories,” but these
are purely descriptive; there is no evidence that the testimony of these or other
evacuees informed the organization’s evaluation of the operation.100 Only two of them
even include direct quotations.
For a historian studying the Cilician case, French state sources can help us under-
stand the political decision to carry out the evacuation. They document it as a
bureaucratic and logistical operation, from the point of view of those who planned
and executed it. But they offer little or no purchase for a full investigation of the
experience of evacuation itself. Nowhere among them is the evacuees’ own experience
recorded. To understand what such events meant to the evacuees, historians would
need to look to the much more fragmentary, dispersed, and multilingual refugee
archive: private papers, for example, or published or unpublished memoirs. For
humanitarian practitioners hoping to learn from the past, meanwhile, it may be
instructive to know how the development of logistical and bureaucratic techniques
made mass evacuation practicable, and how the emergence of a humanitarian
consciousness made it thinkable. But the most immediate lesson of the case lies here,
in the need to listen to the voices of the people who are being evacuated.
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